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Large but rare cascades triggered by small initial shocks are present in most of the infrastructure
networks. Here we present a simple model for cascading failures based on the dynamical redistri-
bution of the flow on the network. We show that the breakdown of a single node is sufficient to
collapse the efficiency of the entire system if the node is among the ones with largest load. This is
particularly important for real-world networks with a highly hetereogeneous distribution of loads as
the Internet and electrical power grids.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb,89.75.Hc,89.20.Hh
Cascading failures are common in most of the com-
plex communication/transportation networks [1, 2] that
are the basic components of our lives and industry. In
fact, although most failures emerge and dissolve locally,
largely unnoticed by the rest of the world, a few trigger
avalanche mechanisms that can have large effects over
the entire networks.
Cascading failures take place on the Internet, where traf-
fic is rerouted to bypass malfunctioning routers, eventu-
ally leading to an avalanche of overloads on other routers
that are not equipped to handle extra traffic. The redis-
tribution of the traffic can result in a congestion regime
with a large drop of the performance. For instance in
October 1986, during the first documented Internet con-
gestion collapse, the speed of the connection between the
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory and the University of Cal-
ifornia at Berkeley, two places separated only by 200 me-
ters, dropped by a factor 100 [3, 4].
Cascading failures also take place in electrical power
grids. In fact, when for any reason a line goes down, its
power is automatically shifted to the neighboring lines,
which in most of the cases are able to handle the extra
load. Few times, however, also these lines are overloaded
and must redistribute their increased load to their neigh-
bors. This eventually leads to a cascade of failures: a
large number of transmission lines are overloaded and
malfunction at the same time. This is exactly what hap-
pened in August 10 1996 [5, 6] when a 1,300-megawatt
electrical line in southern Oregon sagged in the summer
heat, initiating a chain reaction that cut power to more
than 4 million people in 11 Western States. And proba-
bly this is also what happened in August 14 2003 when
an initial disturbance in Ohio [7] triggered the largest
blackout in the US’s history in which millions of people
remained without electricity for as long as 15 hours.
Large cascading failures are also present in social and
economic systems [8].
How is it possible that a small initial shock, as the
breakdown of an Internet router (or of an electrical sub-
station or line), can trigger avalanches mechanisms affect-
ing a considerable fraction of the network and collapsing
a system that in the past was proven to be stable with
respect to similar shocks ? In this letter we propose a
simple model for cascading failures in complex networks.
Resistance of networks to the removal of nodes or arcs,
due either to random breakdowns or to intentional at-
tacks has been studied in Refs.[9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Such
studies have focussed only on the static properties of the
network showing that the removal of a group of nodes
altogether can have important consequences. Here we
show how the breakdown of a single node is sufficient
to collapse the entire system simply because of the dy-
namics of redistribution of flows on the network. In our
model each node is characterized by a given capacity to
handle the traffic. Initially the network is in a stationary
state in which the load at each node is smaller than its
capacity. The breakdown (removal) of a node changes
the balance of flows and leads to a redistribution of loads
over other nodes. If the capacity of these nodes can not
handle the extra load this will be redistributed in turn,
triggering a cascade of overload failures and eventually
a large drop of the network performance as the ones ob-
served in real systems, like the Internet or the electrical
power grids. The main differences with respect to previ-
ous models [14, 15, 16] are:
1) overloaded nodes are not removed from the network.
It is the communication passing through overloaded (con-
gested) nodes that will get worse, so that eventually the
information/energy will avoid congested nodes.
2) the damage caused by a cascade is quantified in terms
of the decrease in the network efficiency, a variable de-
fined in Ref.[17].
First we introduce the model and then we show some
applications to artificially created topologies, to the In-
ternet and to the electrical power grid of the western
United States.
We represent a generic communication/transportation
network as a valued (weighted) [18] undirected [19] graph
G, with N nodes (the internet routers or the substations
of an electrical power grid) and K arcs (the transmission
lines). G is described by the N × N adjacency matrix
2{eij}. If there is an arc between node i and node j, the
entry eij is the value, a number in the range (0,1] at-
tached to the arc, otherwise eij = 0 [20]. Such a number
is a measure of the efficiency in the communication along
the arc. For instance, in the Internet, the smaller eij
is, the longer it takes to exchange an unitary packet of
information along the arc between i and j. Initially, at
time t = 0, we set eij = 1 for all the existing arcs, mean-
ing that all the transmission lines work perfectly and are
equivalent. The model we will propose consists in a rule
for the time evolution of {eij} that mimics the dynamics
of flow redistribution following the breakdown of a node.
To define the network efficiency [17] we assume that the
communication between a generic couple of nodes takes
the most efficient path connecting them. The efficiency of
a path is the so-called harmonic composition [21, 22, 23]
of the efficiencies of the component arcs. By ǫij we in-
dicate the efficiency of the most efficient path between i
and j. Matrix {ǫij} is calculated by means of the algo-
rithms used in Ref.[17]. Then the average efficiency of
the network is:
E(G) =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i6=j∈G
ǫij (1)
and is used as a measure of the performance of G at a
given time.
The load Li(t) on node i at time t is the total number
of most efficient paths passing through i at time t [24].
Each node is characterized by a capacity defined as the
maximum load that node can handle. Following Ref.[14]
we assume the capacity Ci of node i proportional to its
initial load Li(0):
Ci = α · Li(0) i = 1, 2, ...N (2)
where α ≥ 1 is the tolerance parameter of the network
[25]. This is a realistic assumption in the design of an
infrastructure network, since the capacity can not be in-
finitely large because it is limited by the cost. With such
a definition of capacity, the network we have created is in
a stationary state in which it operates with a certain ef-
ficiency E. The initial removal of a node [26], simulating
the breakdown of an Internet router or of an electrical
substation, starts the dynamics of redistribution of flows
on the network. In fact the removal of a node changes
the most efficient paths between nodes and consequentely
the distribution of the loads, creating overloads on some
nodes. At each time t we adopt the following iterative
rule:
eij(t+ 1) =
{
eij(0) ·
Ci
Li(t)
if Li(t) > Ci
eij(0) if Li(t) ≤ Ci
(3)
where j extends to all the first neighbours of i. In this
way if at time t a node i is congested, we reduce the
efficiency of all the arcs passing through it, so that even-
tually the information/energy will take alternative paths
(the new most efficient paths). This is a softer and, for
some applications, a more realistic situation than the one
considered in Ref.[14], in which the overloaded nodes are
removed from the network. Rule (3) produces a decrease
of the efficiency of the network E and, as we will show in
the following, in some cases it can trigger an avalanche
mechanism collapsing the whole system.
We illustrate how our model works in practice by con-
sidering two artificially created network topologies: 1)
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) random graphs [27]; 2) scale-free net-
works, i.e. graphs with an algebraic distribution of de-
gree P (k) ∼ k−γ with γ = 3 generated according to the
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model [28].
In both cases we have constructed networks with N =
2000 and K = 10000. In fig.1 we report the typical time
evolution of the network efficiency for the BA scale-free
network. The dynamics of redistribution of flows is trig-
gered by the removal at time t = 0 of a node chosen
at random. We show the results for three values of the
tolerance parameter, namely α = 1.3, 1.05, 1.01. In the
first case the efficiency of the network is completely un-
affected by the failure of the node. In the second case
the network reaches a stationary state with an efficiency
lower than the initial one. In the third case, because of
the lower tolerance parameter, the cascading failures col-
lapse the system: the network has lost the 40% of the
initial efficiency.
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FIG. 1: Cascading failure in a BA scale-free network as trig-
gered by the initial removal of a single node chosen at random.
We plot the efficiency E of the network as a function of the
time for three values of the tolerance parameter α. The curves
correspond to an average over ten triggers.
In fig.2 we report the final value of the efficiency, i.e.
the efficiency after the system has relaxed to a station-
ary state, as a funtion of the tolerance parameter α. We
consider both the ER random graph and the BA scale-
free graph. Moreover we adopt two different triggering
strategies: random removals and load − based removals .
In the first case (squares) the node removed initially is
chosen at random: in this way we simulate the break-
down of the average node of the network. In the second
case (full circles) the removed node is a very special one
because it is the one with the largest load. Both for the
random and for the scale-free network we observe a de-
crease of the efficiency for small values of the tolerance
parameter α, and the collapse of the system for values
smaller than a critical value αc. ER random graphs ap-
pear to be more resistant to cascading failures than BA
3scale-free graphs (as also found in the model of Ref.[14]).
In both cases the collapse transition is always sharper
for load-based removals than for random removals, al-
though the values of αc can fluctuate for different real-
izations. For the ER random graphs considered we have
obtained αc = 1.02 ± 0.002 for random removals, and
αc = 1.06± 0.005 for load-based removals. For BA scale-
free graphs αc = 1.1 ± 0.004 for random removals, and
αc = 1.3 ± 0.05 for load-based removals [29]. The het-
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FIG. 2: Cascading failure in a) ER random graphs and b)
BA scale-free networks as triggered by the removal of a node
chosen at random (squares), or by the the removal of the
node with largest load (full circles). We report the final (after
the cascade) efficiency E of the network as a function of the
tolerance parameter α. Both the networks considered have
N = 2000 and K = 10000. In the case triggered by the
removal of a node chosen at random the curve corresponds to
an average over 10 triggers.
erogeneity of the network plays an important role in the
network stability. ER random graphs have an exponen-
tial load distribution while BA networks exhibit a power
law distribution in the node load [24]. This makes a large
difference between random removals and load-based re-
movals in BA scale-free networks. In fact there are few
nodes, the ones with extremely high initial load, that are
far more likely than the other nodes (the most part of
the nodes of network) to trigger cascades. Fig.2b shows
the existence of a large region in the tolerance parameter,
1.1 ≤ α ≤ 1.3, where scale-free networks are stable with
respect to random removals and are unstable with re-
spect to load-based removals. If, for instance the nodes
work with a tolerance of 30% above the standard load
(α = 1.3), the network is in general very stable to an
initial shock consisting in the breakdown of a node. This
means that in most of the cases the failure is perfectly
tolerated and reabsorbed by the system. However, there
is always a finite, although very small probability that
the failure triggers an avalanche mechanism collapsing
the whole network.
As examples from the real world we study a network of
the Internet (at the autonomous system level [1, 30]) with
N = 6474 nodes and K = 12567 arcs taken from ref.[31],
and the electrical power grid of the western United States
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FIG. 3: Cascading failure in the Internet. The network con-
sidered is taken from ref.[31] For each value of α we report
the efficiency E after the cascade triggered by the removal of
a node chosen at random (squares), or by the removal of the
node with largest load (full circles). The curve reported for
random removals is an average over 10 different nodes. In the
inset we plot the cumulative node load distribution.
from ref.[32] having N = 4941 and K = 6592. Although
the Internet exhibit a power law degree distribution (as
for BA scale-free networks) while the electrical power grid
has an exponential degree distribution (as for ER random
graphs), we have checked that both the networks consid-
ered are very hetereogeneuos from the point of view of
the loads on nodes. In the insets of fig.3 and fig.4 we
report N(l), the number of nodes with a load larger than
l, as a function of l: the straight lines indicate that the
load distribution is consistent with a power-law with ex-
ponents respectively of 1.80 and 1.75. In the same figures
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FIG. 4: Cascading failure in the electrical power grid of the
western United States from ref.[32]. Same plot as in fig.3
we report the value of the efficiency after the cascade trig-
gered by random failures and load-based failures. Due to
the presence of few nodes with an extremely high ini-
tial load, the figures show a large range of α where the
network is stable against random failures and is vulner-
able with respect to the breakdown of the most loaded
nodes. Although the latter events have a very low prob-
ability their occurrence may collapse the entire systems
with a large effect on our life. These results are a possi-
ble explanation of the mechanism producing the experi-
4mentally observed Internet congestion collapses and the
power blackouts. A small initial shock, as the breakdown
of an Internet router or of an electrical substation or line
may trigger avalanches mechanisms affecting a consider-
able fraction of a network that for years was proven to
be stable with respect to similar shocks. As an example,
if the electric power grid of the western United States of
fig.4 works with a tolerance α = 1.1 (α = 1.5), a case
in which the system is stable with respect to the fail-
ure of most of its nodes, the removal of a special node,
the one with highest initial load, produces a drop of the
30%(15%) of its efficiency.
Summing up, in this paper we have introduced a sim-
ple model to explain why large but rare cascade triggered
by small initial shocks are present in most of the complex
communication/transportation networks that are the ba-
sic components of our lives. The model is based on a dy-
namical redistribution of the flow triggered by the initial
breakdown of a component of the system. The results
show that the breakdown of a single node is sufficient
to affect the efficiency of a network up to the collapse
of the entire system if the node is among the ones with
largest load. This is particularly important for networks
with a highly hetereogeneous distribution of node loads
as BA scale-free networks, but also real-world networks
as the Internet and electrical power grids. Our results
show that it is only the breakdown of a selected minority
of the nodes that can trigger the collapse of the system.
It is so the same fact that for the majority of the nodes
nothing harmful happens, that leads us to the erroneous
believe that our communication/transportation networks
are safe. Therefore it should be advisable to take into
proper account, in the design of any complex network,
the cascading failures effects analyzed here.
Acknowledgement. We thank D.J. Watts for the US
power-grid data from ref.[32] and A. Rapisarda for useful
comments.
[1] S.N. Dorogovtesev, J.F.F. Mendes, Evolution of net-
works, Oxford University Press 2003.
[2] S.H. Strogatz, Nature (London) 410, 268 (2001).
[3] V. Jacobson, Comput. Comm. Rev. 18, 314 (1988).
[4] R. Guimera`, A. Arenas, A. Dı´az-Guilera, and F. Giralt,
Phys. Rev. E 66, 026704 (2002).
[5] B.A. Carreras, D.E. Newman, I. Dolrou, and A.B. Poole,
in Proceedings of Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences, January 4-7, 2000, Maui, Hawaii (un-
published).
[6] M.L. Sachtjen, B.A. Carreras, and V. E. Lynch, Phys.
Rev. E 61, 4877 (2000).
[7] J. Glanz and R. Perez-Pena, 90 Seconds That Left Tens of
Millions of People in the Dark New York Times, August
26, (2003).
[8] D.J. Watts, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 99, 5766
(2002).
[9] R. Albert, H. Jeong, and A.-L. Baraba´si, Nature 406,
378 (2000); Correction Nature 409, 542 (2001).
[10] P. Holme, B.J. Kim, C.N. Yoon and S.K. Han, Phys. Rev.
E65, 056109 (2002).
[11] P. Crucitti , V. Latora, M. Marchiori, and A. Rapisarda.
Physica A 320 622 (2003).
[12] M. Girvan, and M. E. J. Newman. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 99, 8271 (2002).
[13] A.E. Motter, T. Nishikawa, and Y. Lai, Phys. Rev. E 66,
065103 (2002).
[14] A.E. Motter, and Y. Lai, Phys. Rev. E 66, 065102(R)
(2002).
[15] Y. Moreno, R. Pastor-Satorras, A. Va´zquez, and A.
Vespignani, Europhys. Lett. 62, 292 (2003).
[16] Y. Moreno, J. B. Gomez and A. F. Pacheco, Europhys.
Lett. 58, 630 (2002).
[17] V. Latora and M. Marchiori, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 198701
(2001).
[18] S. Wasserman and K. Faust, Social Networks Analysis
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994).
[19] The model can be easily generalized to directed graphs.
[20] In the case of an unweighted graph eij is 1 if there is an
arc joining node i to node j, and 0 otherwise.
[21] J. Smith, Communications of the ACM 31 1202 (1988).
[22] R. Jain, The Art of Computer Systems Performance
Analysis, Wiley, 1991.
[23] The harmonic composition of N numbers x1, x2, ..., xN is
defined as (
∑N
i=1
1
xN
)−1
[24] K.-I. Goh, B. Kahng, and D. Kim, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87,
278701 (2001).
[25] Another possibility which gives the same results is to set
Ci = α ·maxj Lj(0) ∀i = 1, 2, ..., N .
[26] As a initial damage on the network here we consider the
removal of a node, altough the dynamics of the model
can be started by the removal of one arc if one wants
to simulate, for instance, the breakdown of a line in an
electrical power grid.
[27] P. Erdo¨s and A. Re´nyi, Publicationes Mathematicae 6,
290 (1959)
[28] A.-L. Baraba´si and R. Albert, Science 286, 509 (1999).
[29] For load-based removals in BA scale-free graphs we have
found that αc is independent of the size of the system. In
fact we have obtained: αc = 1.45±0.06, 1.41±0.07, 1.44±
0.05 αc = 1.28±0.05, 1.3±0.05, 1.28±0.05 respectively for
N = 1500, 2000, 2500. Such a result is similar to what ob-
tained in a simpler model, the fiber-bundle model, stud-
ied in Ref.[16].
[30] R. Pastor-Satorras, A. Va´zquez, and A. Vespignani,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 258701 (2001).
[31] http://moat.nlanr.net/AS/Data/ASconnlist.20000102.946809601
[32] D.J. Watts and S.H. Strogatz, Nature 393, 440 (1998).
